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PREFACE 
This paper was originally written for the conference on "No More Secrets? Policy Implications 
of Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites," held at the Carnegie Endowment on May 26, 1999. 
Sponsored by the Endowment’s Project on Transparency, the conference brought together 
representatives of a score of countries, many U.S. government departments, congressional staff, 
several nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the media for a day-long 
immersion in the technical and policy issues associated with the emergence of commercial high-
resolution satellites. The conference report is available from Ann Florini, director of the Project 
on Transparency. Highlights of the conference can be seen on the Endowment’s web site at 
www.ceip.org. The Project on Transparency is deeply grateful to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
for its financial support for the conference. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the earliest satellites and astronauts started taking pictures of the Earth from space 
nearly four decades ago, those images have inspired excitement, introspection, and, often, fear. 
Like all information, satellite imagery is in itself neutral. But satellite imagery is a particularly 
powerful sort of information, showing both comprehensive vistas and surprising detail. Its 
benefits can be immense—but so can its costs. The same images that remind us that we all share 
a fragile planet also enable those who have the images to more accurately aim their weapons at 
adversaries near and far. 
And now, the number of people able to use that imagery is exploding. By the turn of the century, 
new satellites will likely be in orbit with capabilities approaching those of military spy satellites, 
but with one key difference: the satellite operators plan to do their best to sell that imagery to 
anyone able and willing to pay. An America-Russian joint venture is already selling imagery that 
shows objects as small as two meters across (available through the Web at www.terraserver.com). 
An American company, a Lockheed offshoot called Space Imaging, launched a substantially 
more sophisticated satellite with one-meter resolution in April 1999. That satellite never reached 
orbit due to a problem with the launch vehicle, but Space Imaging has a backup satellite nearly 
ready to go, and a dozen other U.S. companies have licenses to launch high-resolution imaging 
satellites over the next few years. 
The new commercial satellites will make it possible for the buyers of that imagery to, among 
other things, tell the difference between trucks and tanks, expose movements of large groups like 
troops or refugees, and pinpoint the probable location of natural resources. Whether all this 
amounts to a positive or negative development depends on who chooses to use the imagery and 
how. On the plus side, governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may find it 
easier to respond quickly to sudden refugee movements, to document and publicize large-scale 
humanitarian atrocities, to monitor environmental degradation, or to manage international 
disputes before they escalate. The United Nations is even looking into the possibility that 
satellite imagery could help control drug trafficking and narcotics production. But there is no 
way to guarantee benevolent uses. Governments, corporations, or small groups could use the 
imagery to conduct industrial espionage, collect intelligence, plan terrorist attacks, or mount 
offensive military operations. And even when intentions are good, it can be remarkably difficult 
to know what you are looking at. The media have already made major mistakes, misinterpreting 
images of everything from Chernobyl in 1986 to the Indian nuclear test site just last year. 
Such bloopers notwithstanding, the new satellite imagery will reveal to many people information 
to which they never before had access. That makes the advent of these satellites both important 
in itself and a microcosm of a larger trend now sweeping the world—growing transparency. It is 
becoming more and more difficult to hide information, not only due to technological 
improvements, but also because of spreading norms about who is entitled to have access to what 
information. The idea is gaining ground across issue areas and in many parts of the world that 
governments, corporations, and other concentrations of political and economic power are obliged 
to provide information about themselves to others. In politics, several countries are enacting or 
strengthening freedom-of-information laws that provide citizens the right to information on 
governmental records. In environmental issues, the current hot topic is regulation by revelation, 
in which polluters are required not to stop polluting but to reveal publicly just how much they are 
polluting. Such requirements have dramatic effects. Partly to avoid being labeled as big polluters 
and partly to stop wasting materials they had not previously realized they were wasting, many 
companies covered by such laws have drastically reduced emissions. In arms control, mutual 
inspections of sensitive military facilities have become so commonplace that it is easy to forget 
how revolutionary the idea was a decade or two ago. As democratic norms spread, as civil 
society grows stronger and more effective in its demands for information around the world, as 
globalization gives people an ever greater stake in knowing more about what is going on in other 
parts of the world, and as technology makes such knowledge easier to attain, transparency would 
appear to be the ineluctable wave of the future. 
The legitimacy of remote sensing satellites is part of this global trend toward transparency. 
Imagery from high-resolution satellites is becoming available now not only because technology 
has advanced to the point of making the imagery a potential source of substantial profits, but 
because governmental policies permit, and indeed encourage, such satellites to be operated. Yet 
as is always the case with increases in transparency, not everyone benefits and not all uses of the 
resulting information are benign. Governments remain concerned about just how far this new 
source of transparency should be allowed to go. The provision of information shifts power from 
the former holders of secrets to the newly informed, which has implications for national 
sovereignty, for the ability of corporations to keep proprietary information secret, and for the 
balance of power between state and nonstate actors. 
Sovereignty is directly challenged by the new satellite systems. If the satellite operators are 
permitted to image territory anywhere in the world and sell that imagery to anyone, governments 
lose a significant degree of control over information about their territory. Although both spy 
satellites and civilian satellites have been doing this for years, the operators of the spy satellites 
have been remarkably reticent about the information they have collected, making it relatively 
easy for countries being imaged to ignore them. Pakistan and India may not like being observed 
in such detail by the United States and Russia, but as long as the high-resolution satellite 
operators were not showing information about Pakistan to India and vice versa, objections 
remained muted. Although the civilian satellites that operated before the 1990s did provide 
imagery to the public, they had much lower resolution, generally not showing objects smaller 
than 10 meters across. That low-resolution imagery could provide only very limited militarily 
significant information, nothing like the information that will be available from the new one-
meter systems. 
Under international law, countries have no grounds for objecting to being imaged from outer 
space. The existing standards, the result largely of long-standing U.S. efforts to render legitimate 
both military reconnaissance and civilian imaging from space, are codified in two UN documents. 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 establishes the notion that outer space cannot be claimed as 
national territory, legitimating satellite travel in space over any country’s territory. And despite 
years of efforts by then-Soviet bloc and developing countries to claim a right of prior consent in 
order to review and possibly withhold any data about their territory, in 1986 the UN General 
Assembly adopting a set of legal principles on civilian remote sensing that make no mention of 
any right of prior consent. Instead, the principles merely require that "As soon as the primary 
data and the processed data concerning the territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the 
sensed State shall have access to them on a nondiscriminatory basis and on reasonable cost 
terms." 
In other words, if a country being imaged knows that it is being imaged and asks for a copy, it is 
entitled to buy one at the going rate. Even then, countries won’t know who is asking for specific 
images, or for what purposes. Does a request for imagery of military bases come from an NGO 
trying to monitor a country’s compliance with some international accord, or from an adversary 
preparing to strike? There is a major economic concern as well. Corporations may know more 
about a country’s natural resources than the government does, putting governments at a growing 
disadvantage when negotiating drilling rights or other agreements. And as we have all seen 
recently, highly visible refugee flows and humanitarian atrocities can attract intense attention 
from the international community, even while less visible disasters are ignored. The new 
imagery poses the possibility that the ability of NGOs and the media to track refugee flows or 
environmental catastrophes will encourage more in the way of international interventions, even 
over the resistance of the host government. Whether the rather lackadaisical protection of 
sovereignty contained in the 1986 legal principles will still satisfy governments whose territory 
is being observed by large numbers of increasingly observant commercial satellites seems 
questionable. 
Governments are not the only ones who may feel an acute new sense of vulnerability. 
Corporations may find themselves being observed by competitors trying to keep tabs on their 
construction of new production facilities around the world and estimate the size of their 
production runs by looking at their emissions. This is not corporate espionage as usually defined, 
because satellite imaging is thoroughly legal. But it could in time make it quite difficult for 
corporations to keep their plans and practices secret.  
And it will not be only competitors who want to keep an eye on corporations. Environmentalists, 
for example, may find the new satellites a useful means of monitoring what corporations are 
doing to the environment.1 Karen Litfin has pointed out that environmental NGOs already make 
extensive use of the existing relatively low-resolution imagery that is publicly available to 
monitor enforcement of the U.S. Endangered Species Act, to document destruction of coral reefs 
around the world, and to generate plans for ecosystem management.2  
Environmental groups are just part of a host of nongovernmental organizations likely to take 
advantage of this new source of information. Some groups that work on security and arms 
control have already used, and publicized, satellite imagery, such as the Verification Technology 
and Information Centre in London and the Federation of American Scientists in Washington. As 
publicly available imagery improves from five-meter to one-meter resolution, humanitarian 
groups may find it increasingly useful in dealing with complex humanitarian emergencies and 
tracking refugee flows.3 In all these cases, nongovernmental groups will find themselves 
increasingly able to gather and analyze information independently of governments—an 
important new source of power for civil society. 
In short, the emergence of widespread civilian and commercial remote sensing satellites 
promises both benefits and costs, and thus raises a host of pressing policy questions. Who is 
regulating them, who should be, and how? Does the new transparency portend an age of peace 
and stability, or does it create new vulnerabilities that will make the world more rather than less 
unstable and violent? When should satellite imagery be treated as a public good, to be provided 
(or controlled) by governments, and when is it a private good to be created by profit-seekers and 
sold to the highest bidder? Who gets to decide? Is it possible to reconcile the public value of the 
free flow of information for such pressing purposes as humanitarian relief, environmental 
protection, and crisis management with the needs of the industry to make a profit by selling that 
information? 
THE POLICY HISTORY 
To grapple with these questions, it is important to start with a good understanding of what 
current policy is, how it came about, and who the players are. Because civilian remote sensing 
has been so heavily dominated by the United States until quite recently, both in technological 
and policy terms, much of the story is a U.S. story.  
That story begins with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which 
developed the first civilian remote sensing satellite¾ Landsat. After the launch of Landsat 1 in 
1972, the nongovernmental sector got its first glimpse of satellite images of earth. However, 
Landsat 1’s relatively low resolution¾ 80 meters multispectral¾ was too coarse for most 
commercial purposes. During these early years, research scientists, educators, and government 
agencies comprised the principal patrons of Landsat imagery.  
In an effort to expand the user base for Landsat data and set the stage for the eventual 
commercialization of the civilian remote sensing industry, the Carter administration issued 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 54 in July 1979. The PDD transferred the operation of the 
Landsat systems to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the 
Department of Commerce and directed NOAA to "seek ways to further private sector 
opportunities in civil land remote sensing activities … with the goal of eventual operations of 
these activities by the private sector."4 The administration hoped that under NOAA the 
management cost of the Landsat program would decline significantly, thus improving the 
prospects for its eventual commercialization. Moreover, it was believed that future availability of 
30-meter resolution imagery from Landsats 4 and 5¾ planned to be launched within the next five 
years¾ would dramatically increase the revenue earned from the sale of Landsat imagery.5 
These two factors combined, it was reasoned, would ultimately lead to the creation of an 
affordable and robust market for remote sensing data, which would encourage the growth of a 
commercial satellite industry that could develop and operate remote sensing systems for 
government and private markets.6 
Following the election of President Ronald Reagan, the Carter administration's gradual approach 
to commercialization of the Landsat program was abandoned in favor of a far more accelerated 
plan. In an attempt to cut federal spending by privatizing government programs, the Reagan 
administration ignored evidence that suggested that the remote sensing market was not 
sufficiently mature to sustain an independent commercial remote sensing industry. That evidence 
included four feasibility studies commissioned by the U.S. government between 1982 and 1983. 
The first study was undertaken by the Civil Operational Remote Sensing Satellite Advisory 
Committee (CORSSAC) of the Department of Commerce. The study found that the commercial 
market for Landsat data was seriously underdeveloped and, therefore, recommended that 
"commercialization of the Landsat program should be done gradually."7 
The other three studies supported the CORSSAC conclusions. Following an in-depth analysis of 
the satellite imagery market, ECON Incorporated concluded that "full transfer of the civil land 
remote sensing system to the private sector, with the expectation of a viable self-sustaining 
enterprise, is premature."8 Similarly, Earth Satellite Corporation declared that "No option was 
found that would permit the [Landsat] program to be commercialized, today or in the near future, 
without substantial subsidies or government-guaranteed data purchases."9 Using a much harsher 
tone, the National Academy of Public Administration argued that the Reagan administration’s 
decision to transfer operations of the Landsat program to the private sector "fails to meet sensible 
criteria of preservation of the national security," and represents a "forced premature privatization 
of these responsibilities."10  
Despite these cautionary words, the Reagan administration pressed ahead. Faced with the 
likelihood that funding for the Landsat program would soon be discontinued, Congress quickly 
approved the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act (P.L. 98-365), which was signed into 
law on July 17, 1984. The Act directed the Secretary of Commerce to select a contractor to 
operate the Landsat system; instructed system operators to market the resulting data on a 
nondiscriminatory basis; required the Department of Commerce to maintain an archive of land 
remote sensing data for historical, scientific, and technical purposes; and established a licensing 
and oversight process for the anticipated private remote sensing industry.  
Despite the 1984 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, commercial interest in the 
remote sensing industry remained limited. In an attempt to jumpstart private initiatives in the 
remote sensing sector, the U.S. government tried to turn the Landsat program into a 
moneymaking private venture. Thus, in September 1985, NOAA selected Earth Observation 
Satellite Company (EOSAT), a joint venture of RCA Corporation and Hughes Aircraft Company, 
to operate the Landsat satellites and market the resulting data for a period of ten years. 
According to the terms of the contract, the U.S. government would continue to cover the 
operational costs of the Landsat program through the three-year expected lifetime of Landsats 4 
and 5. In addition, because the market for remote sensing data was considered underdeveloped, 
the U.S. government agreed to subsidize EOSAT in the amount of $295 million over a five year 
period to develop and launch two new Landsat spacecraft¾ Landsats 6 and 7. Upon the launch of 
Landsat 6, EOSAT would assume full responsibility for all operational costs of the Landsat 
program. Policy makers and EOSAT executives believed—or hoped—that during the lifetime of 
Landsats 6 and 7, EOSAT's revenues would grow sufficiently to allow the company to finance 
the development, launch, and operation of future land remote sensing systems.11 
Responsibility for the operation of the Landsat program was transferred to EOSAT in October 
1985. But the government failed to keep its end of the bargain. The Reagan administration 
deleted additional subsidies to EOSAT in its FY 1987 budget proposal, arguing that the 
remaining $125 million called for in the EOSAT-NOAA contract would have to come from 
EOSAT or other private sources. As a result, EOSAT began laying off employees in December 
1986 and ceased all marketing and spacecraft development activities. The Congress again 
intervened in order to ensure the survival of the Landsat program beyond Landsat 5. In FY 1987, 
Congress appropriated $62.5 million to continue the development of Landsat 6; however, the 
funds could not be released until NOAA drafted and Congress approved a new Landsat 
commercialization plan.  
In June 1987, NOAA submitted its new commercialization proposal to Congress. It called for 
only one additional Landsat satellite to be developed by EOSAT as well as a feasibility study for 
a second satellite that might include more advanced or commercially oriented sensors. Congress 
initially rejected this proposal, but acquiesced in October 1987. Between November 1987 and 
April 1988, NOAA renegotiated its contract with EOSAT. The revised contract directed EOSAT 
to develop Landsat 6 and all associated ground systems. The government agreed to subsidize the 
project up to $220 million; any additional costs would have to be absorbed by EOSAT. Under an 
innovative "payback" arrangement, EOSAT also agreed to refund $10.8 million to the 
government over a period of approximately four years. In addition, EOSAT waived all rights to 
data from follow-on civil remote sensing spacecraft beyond Landsat 6. With this agreement in 
place, Congress finally released the $62.5 million appropriated for the development of Landsat 6 
in the FY 1987 budget. 
As soon as the Landsat 6 development dilemma was resolved, the Landsat program faced yet 
another crisis. The 1984 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act had instructed NOAA to 
finance the operations of Landsats 4 and 5 through the expected lifetime of the two satellites, 
which was due to expire at the end of 1987. Consequently, NOAA had no plans to fund either 
satellite after the expiration date, regardless of whether the satellites were still operational. Thus, 
NOAA did not request any funds for the Landsat program in its FY1989 budget. Congress 
quickly appropriated $9.4 million to fund Landsats 4 and 5 for the first half of the fiscal year and 
asked NOAA to secure funding for the second half. Unable to obtain sufficient funds, NOAA 
directed EOSAT to turn the satellites off in April 1989. This proposal drew strong protests from 
the Congress, foreign governments, and data users in the United States and around the world. In 
response to the outcry, the National Space Council, chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, 
drafted an interim funding plan which asked government agencies that used Landsat imagery to 
provide money to NOAA. Moreover, the National Space Council recommended that the federal 
government ensure continuity of Landsats 4 and 5 operations so long as these satellites were the 
only source of civilian remote sensing data.12 As a result, NOAA rescinded the shutdown order 
in March 1989. 
The same routine played out during the fiscal years 1990 and 1991. In both years, Congress 
provided $9.5 million for the first six months of the each year and asked other government 
agencies which utilized Landsat imagery to provide the remaining funds. Finally, on June 1, 
1989, President George Bush "approved funding for continued operations of Landsat satellites 4 
and 5 and for the completion and launch of Landsat 6."13 In addition, President Bush "directed 
the National Space Council and the Office of Management and Budget to review options with 
the intention of continuing Landsat-type data collections after Landsat 6."14 
The Undoing of Landsat Commercialization 
By the early 1990s, several factors compelled the U.S. government to review the Land Remote 
Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984. First, the forced commercialization of the Landsat 
program had faltered badly. Instead of spending $295 million to acquire and deploy two Landsat 
satellites, the U.S. government had committed itself to spending $245.7 million to develop and 
launch only one. Moreover, Landsat commercialization had dramatically increased the price of 
Landsat imagery. As a result, the number of requests for MSS data dropped from 35,272 in 1984 
to only 8,000 in 1990.15 The $4,400 price tag for a single thematic mapper scene deterred many 
scientists and academics from purchasing Landsat data. 
Second, the emergence of foreign competitors to Landsat imagery eliminated the United States’ 
comfortable position as the sole provider of remote sensing data. France successfully launched 
SPOT-1 in February 1986 and SPOT-2 in January 1990. Both satellites could provide higher 
resolution images of earth and had a shorter revisit time than the U.S. Landsat system. Although 
SPOT lacked Landsats’ broader swath width and more numerous spectral bands, many in the 
United States still worried that SPOT would dominate the remote sensing market. This concern 
gained new urgency as SPOT’s sale of remote sensing imagery surpassed that of EOSAT by 
1989.16 Many within and outside the U.S. government began to question the wisdom of a policy 
that allowed foreign countries to surpass the United States in an industry that was pioneered by 
the United States 
Third, Landsat imagery proved remarkably useful during the planning and execution of the 1990-
1991 Persian Gulf War. As D. Brian Gordon of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified, "There 
were significant contributions by Landsat … to the success of Operation Desert Storm."17 
According to some estimates, the U.S. Department of Defense spent between $5 to $6 million on 
Landsat imagery during the Gulf War.18 Throughout the conflict, Landsat imagery was used by 
allied forces for terrain analysis, operational planning, and concealment detection.19 
All these pressures led the U.S. Congress to pass the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act (P.L. 102-
555), which was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on October 28, 1992. The Act 
recognized that "the continuous collection and utilization of land remote sensing data from space 
are of major benefit in studying and understanding human impacts on the global environment, in 
managing the Earth’s natural resources, in carrying out national security functions, and in 
planing and conducting many other activities of scientific, economic, and social importance."20 
The Act further acknowledged that "despite the success and importance of the Landsat system, 
funding and organizational uncertainties over the past several years have placed its future in 
doubt and have jeopardized United States leadership in land remote sensing."21 Therefore, the 
Act rejected full commercialization of the Landsat program "within the foreseeable future"22 
and transferred control of the Landsat system to the National Aeronautic and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD). Authority for licensing private 
remote sensing satellites was left with the Secretary of Commerce, as it had been under the 1984 
Act, with advisory roles given to the Secretaries of State and Defense. 
Shortly after the passage of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, disagreements arose between 
NASA and the DOD over what type of sensors should be placed on board the Landsat 7 satellite. 
NASA favored the cheaper Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM) Plus capable of acquiring 15-
meter images of earth. DOD, on the other hand, pushed for a new sensor, the High Resolution 
Multispectral Stereo Imager (HRMSI), which could collect 5-meter-resolution data of particular 
interest to the Department of Defense. The disagreement had not yet been resolved when disaster 
struck. 
At approximately 11:08 a.m. (PST) on October 5, 1993, nearly 13 minutes after the launch of 
Landsat 6, a ruptured hydrazine manifold prevented fuel from reaching the satellite engine and 
the $256.5 million spacecraft plunged into the Pacific Ocean.23 Following the failure of Landsat 
6 to reach orbit, NASA concluded that the high cost of developing the HRMSI sensor could 
undermine the timely development and deployment of Landsat 7. Thus, in September 1993, 
NASA officially rejected placement of the HRMSI sensor on board Landsat 7. Consequently, the 
Department of Defense pulled out of the Landsat program.  
With the Department of Defense out, the question of which agency or agencies should develop 
and operate the Landsat system and market the resulting data once again came to the forefront. 
This issue was finally resolved by the White House in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-3) 
that was announced on May 10, 1994. According to the PDD, NASA would be responsible for 
developing and launching Landsat 7, NOAA would operate the spacecraft and all relevant 
ground systems, and the Department of Interior would archive and distribute the data at the 
marginal cost of reproduction.  
As this paper is being written, however, yet another rearrangement of responsibilities for the 
Landsat program is underway. A new PDD has been drafted that will transfer all operational 
responsibility of the Landsat 7 program from NOAA to the Department of Interior’s U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS). Given that USGS has a more obvious interest in pursuing land 
remote sensing activities than NOAA, the transfer is expected to be approved in the very near 
future. 
With the successful launch of Landsat 7 on April 15, 1999, the United States came full circle, 
restoring a significant government subsidy to civilian remote sensing, although now with a 
substantially improved satellite. Landsat 7 will provide 15-meter panchromatic and 30-meter 
multispectral images of earth for the next five years. It will have the ability to re-image areas of 
interest every 16 days with its more accurate ETM Plus sensor. More importantly, Landsat 7 
images will be made available to all consumers of satellite imagery "at the cost of fulfilling user 
requests."24 At present, these prices are set at $475 per scene for minimally processed data and 
at $600 per scene for radiometrically and geometrically corrected data¾ over fifty percent 
cheaper than any other comparable commercially available civilian or private satellite 
imagery.25 It is hoped that Landsat 7, launched nearly 30 years after the deployment of the first 
Landsat spacecraft, will once again place the United States in the forefront of the international 
civilian remote sensing industry. 
The Emergence of a U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Industry 
Although the legal framework for licensing and regulating a commercial remote sensing industry 
was established in 1984 by the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, no such industry 
emerged until the early 1990s. In July 1992, shortly before the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act 
was signed into law, WorldView Inc. applied for a license to operate a commercial satellite 
capable of achieving three-meter panchromatic images of earth. On January 4, 1993, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) approved WorldView’s license. Since then, 
NOAA has issued twelve more such licenses. 
Table 1: Licensed Commercial Systems (1984 - 1999)  
Company Date Applied 
Date 
Approved System Web Site 
WorldView 
Inc./Earth Watch 15-Jul-92 04-Jan-93 EarlyBird www.digitalglobe.com 
EOSAT 06-Oct-92 17-Jun-93 Landsat 6 www.spaceimaging.com/ 
Lockheed/Space 
Imaging 10-Jun-93 22-Apr-94 
IKONOS-
1 www.spaceimaging.com/ 
OrbImage 14-Dec-93 
05-May-
94 
OrbView-
1 www.orbimage.com/ 
OrbImage 14-Dec-93 01-Jul-94 
OrbView-
2 www.orbimage.com/ 
Astrovision 26-Mar-94 25-Jan-95 N/A N/A  
EarthWatch/Ball 18-May-94 02-Sep-94 QuickBird www.digitalglobe.com 
GDE Systems 
Imaging/ Marconi 
North America 
02-Mar-
95 14-Jul-95 N/A www.marconi-is.com/ 
Motorola 31-Mar-95 14-Jul-95 N/A N/A 
Boeing 
Commercial Space 19-Jan-96 
16-May-
96 N/A 
www.boeing.com/defense-
space/space/ 
CTA Corporation 06-Sep-96 09-Jan-97 N/A N/A 
RDL Space 
Corporation 
01-Mar-
97 16-Jun-98 
RADAR-
1 www.rdl.com/ 
Space Technology 
Development 
Corporation 
11-May-
98 
26-Mar-
99 NEMO www.spacetechnology.com/ 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; NationalEnvironmental 
Satellite, 
Data, and Information Services. May 13, 1999.  
This explosion of corporate interest reflects four political and technological changes that have 
created a newly hospitable environment for private initiatives. First, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union removed many of the barriers that had stifled private initiatives in the remote sensing 
sector. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. commercial interests were constantly subordinated to 
containment of the Soviet threat. As a result, investors were often deterred from developing 
sensitive dual-use technologies that might be subjected to strict government scrutiny and 
regulation. Consequently, as Table 1 indicates, between 1984 and 1992, no U.S. firm bothered to 
apply for a license to operate commercial satellites despite the fact that the legal framework for 
such ventures was firmly in place.  
Second, the belief that over the coming decades the market for remote sensing data would grow 
exponentially has had a tremendously positive impact on the growth of the private satellite 
industry within the United States. Despite enormous discrepancies among various estimates of 
the volume of the remote sensing market in the future, most investors are optimistic that if they 
build the systems, the users will come.26 The potential future consumers of remote sensing data 
include farmers, city planners, map makers, environmentalists, emergency response teams, news 
organizations, surveyors, geologists, mining and oil companies, timber harvesters, and domestic 
as well as foreign military planners and intelligence organizations.27 Many of these groups 
already use satellite imagery provided by French, Russian, and Indian satellites, in addition to 
Landsat, although none of these satellites matches the capabilities of the new American 
commercial systems. Hence, this sense of optimism about the future of the remote sensing 
market coupled with the desire to capture a larger share of that market has driven many 
companies to invest in commercial satellites and the associated ground systems. 
Third, advances in panchromatic, multispectral, and even hyperspectral data acquisition, storage, 
and processing along with the ability to quickly and efficiently transfer such data files 
electronically has further supported the growth of the remote sensing industry. As Ray 
Williamson has noted, "one of the impediments to developing a data market [during the early 
1980s] was the absence of a supportive information infrastructure."28 Since then, the situation 
changed dramatically. The advent of powerful personal computers capable of handling large data 
files, the development of geographic information system (GIS) software designed to manipulate 
spatial data, and the growth of data distribution mechanisms such as CD-ROM disks and the 
internet have all facilitated marketing and sale of satellite imagery, which has in turn promoted 
the growth of the remote sensing industry. 
Fourth, active U.S. government support has also encouraged the commercial satellite industry 
within the United States. After Landsat commercialization failed, the U.S. government took steps 
to promote the growth of an independent commercial satellite industry in the United States. 
Concerned that foreign competitors such as France, Russia, and India might dominate the market 
for satellite imagery, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 23 on 
March 10, 1994. The PDD, among other things, loosened restrictions on the sale of high 
resolution satellite imagery to foreign entities.29 It demonstrated a clear desire by the U.S. 
government to maintain a strong presence in the international remote sensing market. 
The U.S. government has also tried to promote the growth of the U.S. commercial remote 
sensing industry through direct subsidies to private companies and through guaranteed data 
purchases. Earth Watch, Space Imaging, and OrbImage, for example, have all been awarded 
between $2 and $4 million to upgrade their ground systems to facilitate the transfer of imagery 
data from their satellites to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). In addition, the 
Air Force has agreed to subsidize OrbImage at up to $30 million to develop and deploy the 
Warfighter sensor capable of acquiring 8-meter hyperspectral images of Earth. Although access 
to most of Warfighter’s higher resolution imagery will be restricted to government agencies, 
OrbImage will be able to sell 24-meter hyperspectral images to nongovernmental sources. 
Similarly, the Office of Naval Research has recently concluded an agreement with Space 
Technology Development Corporation (STDC) whereby the U.S. Navy will provide 
approximately $60 million to STDC to develop and deploy the NEMO satellite with 30-meter 
hyperspectral and 5-meter panchromatic sensors. This satellite will not only fulfil the imagery 
needs of the Navy, but it will also ensure continued U.S. competitiveness in the field of 
commercial remote sensing. 
In addition to direct subsidies to various satellite companies, the U.S. intelligence community has 
also reached separate agreements with a number of current and future satellite operators to 
purchase high resolution satellite imagery. Since fiscal year 1998, for example, the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) has "spent about $5 [million] annually on commercial 
imagery."30 According to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, it is expected that this figure 
will increase by nearly "800 percent … over the next five years."31 
Current Policy Choices 
The whole history of U.S. policy toward remote sensing has been one of grappling with two 
difficult tradeoffs: between protection of national security secrets versus promotion of Open 
Skies as a means of legitimating satellite reconnaissance and civilian remote sensing, and 
between establishing a commercial industry versus ensuring the public benefits of this unusually 
comprehensive, and expensive, source of information. To legitimate satellite remote sensing, the 
United States pushed hard and successfully for international legal principles allowing unimpeded 
passage of satellites over national territory and for unimpeded distribution of the imagery 
flowing from civilian satellites. To regain U.S. commercial dominance in the technology, the 
United States is permitting U.S.-based companies to launch commercial satellites with 
capabilities substantially better than those available elsewhere. But the United States government, 
like other governments, hesitates to allow the full flowering of transparency. Now that the public 
provision of high-resolution satellite imagery is becoming a global phenomenon, policy 
contradictions are becoming glaringly apparent. 
Unilateral measures: The United States is trying to balance its competing interests in satellite 
imagery in part by a kind of export control with a twist. Unlike other types of dual-use exports, 
where the point is to keep some physical good within U.S. boundaries, even imagery from U.S.-
controlled satellites need never appear within the United States. Satellites make the images in 
outer space, then transmit them to ground stations, many of which are located in other countries. 
To maintain some degree of export control in this unusual situation, the United States has come 
up with a policy called "shutter control." The licenses NOAA has issued for commercial remote 
sensing satellites contain a provision that "During periods when national security or international 
obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised, as defined by the Secretary of Defense 
or the Secretary of State, respectively, the Secretary of Commerce may, after consultation with 
the appropriate agency(ies), require the Licensee to limit data collection and/or distribution by 
the system to the extent necessitated by the given situation." 
But shutter control raises some major problems. For one thing, satellite imagery represents a 
classic case of the difficulty of regulating the "export" of dual-use goods (i.e., those with both 
civilian and military applications). There are powerful incentives working at cross purposes: 
economic interest in maintaining a major U.S. presence in what could be a large and highly 
profitable industry that the United States pioneered, as opposed to national security interest in 
preventing potential adversaries from using the imagery against the United States or its allies, or 
even foreign policy interests in not having certain situations publicized. Yet efforts to deny 
imagery to potential enemies undercut the building of a market for U.S. companies, and may 
relinquish the field to competitors. After all, imagery "consumers" who know that their access to 
imagery may be cut off at any time by the vagaries of U.S. foreign policy may well prefer to 
build commercial relationships with more reliable providers. These difficulties are exacerbated 
by the fact that the U.S. military itself is increasingly relying on these systems and therefore has 
a stake in their commercial success. Not only does such imagery provide a useful source of 
information for U.S. military operations, that information, unlike imagery from U.S. spy 
satellites, can easily be shared with allies—a considerable advantage in operations like Bosnia or 
Kosovo. 
One extreme form of shutter control is simply to permanently prohibit imaging of a given area. 
Although such a policy runs counter to long-standing U.S. efforts to legitimate remote sensing, 
the United States has already instituted one such ban. Under the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment to 
the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. companies are forbidden to collect or sell 
imagery of the entire country of Israel "unless such imagery is no more detailed or precise than 
satellite imagery … that is routinely available from commercial sources." The amendment also 
gives the president the option of extending the blackout to any other country or geographic 
purpose. When the amendment first passed, it did not seem to raise a significant problem. NOAA 
reportedly told the American companies at the time that the Russian Spin-2 film imagery at 
roughly two-meter resolution was equivalent to the U.S. industry’s planned one-meter systems. 
But in July 1998, NOAA informed Earth Watch, Space Imaging, and OrbImage that they would 
not be allowed to distribute imagery of Israel at one-meter or better resolution. News reports 
claim that the change in policy came about as the result of intense lobbying by pro-Israeli groups. 
Given that Israel already operates its own spy satellite (Ofeq-3) and reportedly has plans to enter 
the commercial remote sensing market itself, allegations persist that Israel is at least as interested 
in protecting its commercial prospects by hamstringing American competitors as it is in 
protecting its own security. 
Shutter control faces an additional challenge: it may be unconstitutional. The media have already 
made extensive use of satellite imagery, and some news producers are eagerly anticipating the 
emergence of the new high-resolution systems. The Radio-Television News Producers 
Association argues vehemently that the existing standard violates the First Amendment by 
allowing the government to impose "prior restraint" on the flow of information, with no need to 
prove imminent national harm to an impartial judge. If shutter control is exercised in any but the 
most compelling circumstances, a court challenge is inevitable. 
It is not clear that shutter control will do much to protect U.S. interests even if it survives such a 
challenge. Although the U.S. satellites will be more advanced than any of the systems currently 
in orbit, other than spy satellites, they hardly have the field to themselves. Given the large 
number of alternative sources of imagery, certainly shutter control by itself is not going to 
protect U.S. interests in the long run.  
An alternative is to try to get other operators of high-resolution satellites to agree to restrict the 
collection or dissemination of imagery. Is there scope for negotiation of some kind of agreed 
restraints? Canada, for example, plans to launch a new radar satellite with three-meter resolution. 
Initially, NASA was to launch the satellite but expressed reservations once it became clear just 
how good the resolution on the satellite would be. Whether it will be possible for the two 
countries to come to an understanding on how the distribution of the imagery should be restricted 
remains to be seen, and there is not much reason to believe that Russians, Chinese, or Indians 
would respect U.S. wishes on what imagery should be disseminated or to whom. 
If it proves unworkable in the long run to control the flow of information from satellites, either 
unilaterally or by agreement with other countries, two options remain: taking direct action to 
prevent the satellites from seeing what they would otherwise see, or learning to live with the new 
transparency. Direct action can take two forms: hiding what is on the ground, or disabling the 
satellites in the sky. 
Satellites generally travel in fixed orbits, making it easy to predict when one will be overhead 
and thus when it is necessary to take concealment measures. Hiding things from satellite 
observation is an old Cold War trick. The Soviets used to deploy large numbers of fake tanks and 
even ships. Sensitive objects can be covered with conductive material such as chickenwire 
screening to create a reflective glare that obscures the details of whatever is underneath. Indeed, 
one of the security concerns for the United States is whether countries that currently do not 
bother with trying to conceal their activities from U.S. spy satellites will institute concealment 
measures once they become aware that commercial operators may sell imagery of them to 
regional adversaries or others. In other words, the advent of commercial high-resolution satellite 
imagery may cause the United States to lose access to information it currently has from its spy 
satellites. 
Although concealment is often possible, it will become harder as the number of eyes in the sky 
proliferates, reducing the windows in which to carry out activities unobserved. Moreover, the 
new systems have the ability to look from side to side as well as straight down, so knowing what 
the satellite is observing is not so easy. 
If hiding does not work, what about countermeasures against the satellite? There are many ways 
other than shooting them down to put satellites out of commission, especially unprotected 
civilian systems that are of necessity in low Earth orbit.32 Electronic and electro-optical 
countermeasures can be used to jam or deceive a satellite. Satellites can be spoofed—interfered 
with electronically and made to shut down or change orbit. The operator may never know 
whether a malfunction is merely a technical glitch or the result of a hostile action. (And the 
spoofer may never know whether the target satellite was successfully affected.) 
Such countermeasures could be very useful during crises or war to prevent access to imagery of a 
specific, temporary activity without the legal bother of shutter control or the political hassle of 
negotiated restraints. But during peacetime, they would become rather obvious if carried out on a 
routine basis to prevent imaging of a particular site.  
The more dramatic approach would simply be to shoot the satellites down. Short of a situation of 
imminent or actual war, it is hard to imagine that the United States would want to do this, even to 
satellites operated by nationals of other countries and thus not subject to shutter control. If the 
United States could live with Soviet spy satellites, it is hard to see that it would casually bring 
down international opprobrium on itself by destroying civilian satellites. And in wartime, the 
operators with the greatest satellite capabilities may well be U.S. companies or U.S. allies. Other 
countries might be able to shoot down satellites, but such an act would carry a heavy risk of 
starting a war. And because so many satellites will be operating within the next few years, it is 
virtually unthinkable that even the most paranoid government would be able and willing to bear 
the military and political costs of shooting them all down. 
CONCLUSION 
No one is fully prepared for the era of commercial high-resolution satellite imagery. The U.S. 
government is trying to maintain a kind of export control over a technology that has long since 
proliferated beyond U.S. borders. The international community as a whole agreed over a decade 
ago to permit the unimpeded flow of information from imagery, an agreement that may come 
under considerable strain as new and far more capable satellites begin to distribute imagery 
publicly and widely. Humanitarian, environmental, and arms control NGOs could put the 
imagery to good use, if they can acquire sufficient funds and the necessary expertise, but 
governments may be uncomfortable with the resulting shift in power from state to nonstate 
actors—especially if those nonstate actors include terrorists. And many, many people will make 
mistakes, especially in the early days. Satellite imagery is hard to interpret. Junior analysts are 
wrong far more often than they are right.  
Despite all the potential problems, on balance this new form of transparency is likely to do more 
good than harm. It will allow countries that might otherwise live in fear and suspicion of one 
another to provide credible reassurance that they are not mobilizing for attack. It will help both 
governments and nonstate actors to cope with the growing number of global problems by 
facilitating the creation of comprehensive sources of information that no single government has 
an incentive to provide. Although imagery is subject to misuse and misinterpretation like any 
source of information, the circumstances under which sustained secrecy works to the public 
benefit are few.  
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